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to impeach the credibility of -the witness by introducing statements
which are inconsistent with some material part of his present testimony. 31 Without such evidence, the venom of prejudice will be instrumental in directing the course of justice.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN PENO-CORRECTIONAL LAW

Rights of the Convicted. In the 1970 term, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit decided three important cases which concerned the
rights of convicts within the peno-correctional system. In Sostre v.
McGinnis,32 the court, sitting en banc,83 considered the extent to which
the federal constitutional rights are retained by one incarcerated in a
state penitentary. At issue was the use of prolonged punitive segregation 3 4 for questionable reasons as a disciplinary device against a state
prisoner. The court held, first, that the plaintiff's prolonged segregated
confinement was not such cruel and unusual punishment as to violate
the prohibition of the eighth amendment; 35 second, that the imposition
of punitive segregation upon the plaintiff merely on account of his
"political beliefs and legal activities" is prohibited by the Federal Bill
of Rights; third, that although they may open and inspect all incoming
and outgoing mail of prisoners, prison officials may not censor or refuse
to mail or deliver any correspondence between a prisoner and a court,
a public agency or an official, or any lawyer, if the correspondence concerns his case or his relation to the correctional facility; fourth, that
the Constitution prohibits subjection of prisoners to the arbitrary and
capricious actions of prison officials; and fifth, that the damage award
against the State Commissioner of Corrections was improper.
The plaintiff, Martin Sostre, was serving a thirty to forty-year
prison sentence at Green Haven Correctional Facility in New York
31 See note 24 supra.
32 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1977). A petition for rehearing was filed on March 25, 1971
and was denied on April 8, 1971. Therein, the plaintiff's attorneys said that they
"... fully intend to raise all the issues on which the district court was reversed in a
higher forum." Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing at 2 n.l. For discussion of this procedure,
see Introduction, supra. On March 6, 1972, the United States Supreme Court rejected
appeals by both sides. 166 N.Y.LJ. 45, March 7, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
33 In light of the fact that neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit had
previously considered the implications of prisoner's rights as raised in the district court,
e.g., Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the issues were considered
important enough to necessitate a decision by the entire court. 442 F.2d at 181. Others
who considered it important filed amici curiae briefs: NAACP Legal Defenses and Educational Fund, Inc., the National Office for Rights of the Indigent and the National
Conference of Black Lawyers.
34 This term is employed by both the district court and the court of appeals to
signify what is commonly referred to as solitary confinement. 442 F.2d at 182.
85".. nor [may] cruel and unusual punishments [be] inflicted." US. CoNsr. amend.
VII.
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State.3 6 When he first arrived at Green Haven, Sostre was placed in
solitary confinement for his attempt to mail legal papers during an
overnight stay at Attica State Prison.37 After several days, he was
released from segregation and finally allowed to mail the legal papers.
However, on June 25, 1968, Sostre was returned to punitive segregation where he remained until July 2, 1969.83 The prison officials at
Green Haven put forth several reasons to explain Sostre's long stay in
punitive segregation. It was disclosed that on June 25, 1968, Sostre was
summoned to the Warden's office for questioning on several matters. At
first the questions centered around a letter and some legal papers that
Sostre had attempted to mail to an attorney. Among the papers was a
39
legal paper for use by Mrs. Geraldine Robinson, Sostre's co-defendant.
The Warden told Sostre that this paper could not be mailed. Since
Sostre did not have a license to practice law, he would have to limit
himself to his own case.
Sostre refused to abide by the determination of the warden because
he believed that he was entitled to aid his co-defendant. Furthermore,
Sostre was also questioned concerning an organization which he referred to in his letters, as R.N.A., 40 and the letter he attempted to mail
to his lawyer. However, on this subject, he soon refused to answer any
more questions. 41 Thereafter, the uncooperative Sostre was placed in
punitive segregation, because, as the warden stated,
36Sostre is to serve a one-year sentence and a thirty-day sentence for contempt of
court upon completion of his current sentence. This is not the first time Sostre has been
in prison. From 1952 to 1964, he was incarcerated at Attica Correctional Facility in New
York State, also for selling narcotics. In that period he spent approximately four years in
solitary confinement for his religious activism as a Black Muslim.
It was during that period of incarceration that Sostre initiated his legal activity with
complaints to the federal courts concerning his treatment at Attica. He was instrumental
in obtaining, by his complaints, religious freedom for Black Muslims in state prisons.
Sostre v. McGinnis 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964); Pierce, Sostre,
SaMarion v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961).
37 Sostre v. Rockefeller, 812 F. Supp. 863, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). There is no explanation
given for this segregation in either the district court or the court of appeals opinions.
The court of appeals took note that N.Y. CoRREc. LAw § 137 (McKinney supp. 1970)
empowers the wardens with broad discretion over inmates. The warden can use his
power to "keep any inmate confined in a cell or room apart from the accommodations provided for inmates who are participating in programs of the facility, for such
period as may be necessary for maintenance of order or discipline . . . " Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 1971).
as His release from punitive segregation was pursuant to an order of the district
court which later issued an injunction against any further segregation of Sostre. Sostre
v. Rockefeller, 809 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
39 They were not tried together although indicted together. Mrs. Robinson was also
Sostre's common-law wife. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 6.
40 At the trial Sostre testified that R.N.A. stood for the Republic of New Africa, a
black separatist movement. 442 F.2d at 183.
41 According to the warden, the R.N.A. matter concerned him because he was afraid
it was "an attempt to organize prison inmates for riot and insurrection.' On the basis
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[his] whole attitude was one of defiance, of flatly refusing, ..

to

conduct himself as a proper inmate within the rules, regulations
and laws set down by the State of New York and the Department

of Corrections.42

While in punitive segregation at Green Haven, Sostre petitioned
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York for relief in an action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871., 3 In its
decision, the district court questioned not only the length of time that
Sostre was in punitive segregation but also the procedure used and the
reasons for his punishment. It held that Sostre's segregation was cruel
and unusual punishment; that he was punished for his political beliefs
and legal activities; that he was denied procedural due process before
being committed to segregation; that he should be awarded damages
-

compensatory and punitive -

against the Warden of Green Haven

and the State Commissioner of Corrections.

44

The State of New York

of police reports and weakened prison security, this was a real fear to the warden. Id.
However, Sostre's refusal to talk, was not solely what concerned the warden. In a
letter written to his sister in May, 1968 Sostre had stated: As for me there is no doubt in
my mind whatsoever that I will be out soon, either by having my appeal reversed in the
courts or by being liberated by the Universal Forces of Liberation. Id.
42 442 F.2d at 184. The warden interpreted Sostre's demand to help his co-defendant
as a violation of Rule 54 in the N.Y. State Correction Inmates Rule Book which confines
their correspondence to "their own personal matters." Sostre's refusal to explain R.N.A.
violated Rule 12 requiring that prisoners answer "fully and truthfully" all questions put
to them. Both of Sostre's actions also violated Rule 5 which states that prisoners are to
obey all orders immediately. These were the specific rules the warden felt Sostre violated.
Under former N.Y. CouE.c. LAw § 140 (McKinney 1968), the warden could use punitive
segregation as a means to reduce the prisoner to "submission and obedience." 442 F.2d
at 184.
Furthermore, shortly after entering segregation the warden stated that certain contraband was seized from Sostre. This contraband was: (1) two pieces of black emery paper,
which the warden claimed could be used to escape; (2) tables of contents from six issues
of Harvard Law Review which belonged to Sostre and he was told not to circulate; (3) a
letter from a court to another prisoner which Sostre claimed to be translating for the
Puerto Rican prisoner from English to Spanish. This contraband indicated Sostre had
circulated the Law Review and was "legally" aiding other prisoners without the warden's
permission. The district court believed Sostre had never seen the emery paper and also
considered his other activities protected by the fourteenth amendment. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
43 42 U.S.C. § 1983 1970; which reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights; privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
This section creates a right in law. The jurisdiction for this right in the federal courts
is created by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
44 312 F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
The case against the Governor of New York for racial discrimination in prison
guard hiring practices was dismissed for failure of the plaintiff to prove that cause of
action. Id. at 877. The district court also noted that on July 3, 1969, Sostre was punished
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appealed this decision; Sostre did not appeal the dismissal of the cause
of action against the Governor of New York.
In the majority opinion 5 by Judge Kaufman, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed in part, modified in part and affirmed
in part the decision of the district court. Initially, the majority recognized Sostre's position under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act as a
valid civil rights action by the state prisoner and not a mere sham.4 6
Judicial philosophy has progressed substantially since the 1871 enactment of the Civil Rights Act when one court stated quite unequivocably that a prisoner:
has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty,
but all his personal rights except those which the law in its
humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the
47
state.
Courts now hold that "the incidence of having being convicted of a
crime surely does not deprive a person of all constitutional protections
for the duration of his sentence." 4 Indeed, the Supreme Court of the
United States has recognized that there are rights which prisoners
retain and may sue to enforce. 49 A broad delineation of these rights was
for having dust on his cell bars, an obvious retaliation for his legal success. He was forced
to miss the prison's July 4th celebration. Id. at 869.
45
Only Circuit Judges Friendly and Anderson entirely concurred with Judge Kaufman
in his opinion; Chief Judge Lumbard concurred with most of the opinion; Judge Waterman concurred with the results; Judge Smith concurred in part and dissented in part;
Judge Feinberg dissented and concurred; Judges Hays and Moore dissented.
46442 F.2d at 182. See generally Note, Prisoners Rights Under Section 1983, 57 GEo.
L.J 1270 (1969).
47 Ruflin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt) 1024, 1026 (1871).
48 United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071, 1088 (2d Cir. 1969). In
Gordon v. Garrison, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948) the court discussed this very point:
Defendant denies that plaintiff is entitled to invoke the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act because, since he has been convicted of a felony, he is not technically
a "citizen." But due process of law and equal protection of the laws are guaranteed not only to citizens but to any person and the Civil Rights Act provides a
remedy for deprivation of these rights.
77 F. Supp. at 479 (emphasis added).
From this discussion it would seem that a state prisoner might assert the Civil
Rights Act as a person within the jurisdiction of the United States if he cannot do so,
as a citizen.
Under Nrv YoRK Civm RIGHTS LAW § 79 (McKinney Supp. 1971) a state prisoner
could sue in the State Court of Claims for injuries inflicted by prison employees. However,
as a prerequisite to the suit the prisoner would need the permission of a state supreme
court Judge to begin the action. Cataliotti v. State, 61 Misc. 2d 204, 305 N.Y.S.2d 28
(Ct.CI. 1969). The New York Court of Claims has limited jurisdiction and is limited in the
amount of money damages it can award. One federal court has stated that:
The court does not consider that Section 79 can operate to "suspend" the
"dvil right" to pursue the federal remedy granted for invasions of federal right
under color of state law ....

Beyer v. Weiner, 299 F. Supp. 967, 970 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
491n re Bonner, 151 US. 242 (1894).
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5 0 where the court
expressed by the Sixth Circuit in Coffin v. Reichard,
stated that "a prisoner retains all rights of an ordinary citizen except
51
those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law."
Consistent with this progressive viewpoint, the Second Circuit recognized that Sostre had federal constitutional rights which he could enforce in a federal court. It therefore reviewed the prisoner's complaint
concerning disciplinary procedures at a state penitentiary. Previously,
the federal courts had deemed the state courts the proper place for state
prisoners to complain of state practices.5 2 In Reeding v. Pate,3 the
court examined the reasons expressed by federal courts for ignoring
the petitions of state prisoners: first, prohibitions of the eighth amendment were inapplicable to the states; second, a necessity to exhaust all
state remedies; and, finally, a dislike for becoming involved in the
internal mechanics of state prison practices."4 In Sostre the appellate
court agreed with the district court that neither the exhaustion of
state remedies55 nor even a complaint by letter to the State Commissioner of Corrections 56 was a necessary condition to commencement of
the action in the federal court.
With its jurisdictional questions resolved, the court surveyed the
rights which are not withdrawn from state prisoners as a result of conviction. 57 It stated that state prisoners enjoy, inter alia, the right to be
50 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945).
51 Id. at 445.
52 Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233, 234 (2d Cir. 1961). The court in Pierce extensively
cited cases which held that the remedy lies in the state court in the first instance. Id. at
234-35. In Pierce the trial court, 212 F. Supp. 865 (N.D.N.Y. 1962), considered the plaintiff's claim of religious persecution as a state prisoner properly within the realm of the
state court. The court of appeals, viewing the matter as one of constitutional magnitude,
reversed the district court "hands-off" approach and stated that the district court should
entertain such complaints under the first amendment. Id. at 235. See, e.g., Jordan v.
Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370
(D.D.C. 1962). For a discussion of Fulwood, see Comment, Enforcement of Prison Discipline and Its Effect Upon the Constitutional Rights of Those Imprisoned. 8 Vtu.. L. Rxv.
379 (1963).
53 220 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. I1. 1963).
54 Id. at 126. The last reason can even be perceived as subtly present in the majority
opinion in Sostre. Relatedly, Redding stated:
Accordingly, to the extent that recourse to a federal district court on such a
claim invades the legitimate interest of the State in the internal discipline of its
penal institutions, that interest must give way when a federally created and
protected civil right is allegedly infringed.
Id. at 128.
55 "The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need
not be just sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (the action was under the Civil Rights Act).
" The court of appeals
56 The gesture would be "meaningless and plainly futile ....
upheld the district court finding that the Commissioner already knew the facts. 442
F.2d at 182.
57 For the proposition that some rights may be withdrawn because of "consideration
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479.

free from "discriminatory punishment inflicted solely because of their
beliefs, whether religious or secular."' 8 In its analysis, the court examined the facts to determine whether there was any discriminatory
punishment imposed upon Sostre. The district court had found that
Sostre was not sent to punitive segregation for violation of any rulesserious or trivial - but for his political beliefs and his legal activities
during his prior incarceration at Attica, and because of his threatened
suit against the Warden of Green Haven to enforce his right to correspond with his attorney and his co-defendant."0 After reviewing the
circumstances, the court of appeals concluded that the district court
finding of improper motives on the part of the warden was not clearly
erroneous, and therefore affirmed the conclusion that Sostre's punishment constituted a violation of the due process of law under the fourteenth amendment.0 0 The district court attributed the same improper
motives of the warden to the State Commissioner of Corrections; however, the court of appeals viewed this question quite differently. The
latter court reasoned that the State Commissioner was not aware of all
that occurred in the prison, for any information he received was from
the warden. Thus, any tacit consent he might have given to the warden's
actions was mere deference to one of his bureaucratic brethren. Therefore, the court of appeals dismissed the plaintiff's cause of action against
the State Commissioner of Corrections. 0 '
Next, the majority opinion turned its attention to the finding that
underlying our penal system," see Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948), cited in
442 F.2d at 188-189.
58 Here the court listed cases and the rights for which they stand:
Cooper v. Pate, 378 US. 546, 84 S. Ct. 173, 12 L. Ed. 2d 1030 (1964) (per curiam)
(unlawful to withdraw prison privileges because of inmate's religious faith): see
Lee v. Washington, 590 U.S. 33, 88 S. Ct. 994, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1212 (1968) (per
curiam) (racial segregation); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 373-374
(D.C.D.C. 1962) (religious discrimination). Moreover, the Constitution protects
with special solicitude, a prisoner's access to the courts. Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S.
546, 61 S. Ct. 640, 85 L. Ed. 1034 (1941); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S. Ct.
747, 21 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1969).
442 F.2d at 189.
59 Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 869(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
60442 F.2d at 189-90.
61 Id. at 205. However, Judges Smith and Feinberg disagreed with the majority's
holding concerning the State Commissioner. Although they would not hold the State
Commissioner liable for punitive damages, they would certainly hold him liable to
Sostre for compensatory damages under section 1983 in light of the fact, (which the
dissenters note the majority acknowledges), that the State Commissioner was informed
of Sostre's long segregation and did nothing to terminate it. Thus, for them, the State
Commissioner is liable because he did not act to free Sostre from segregation on the
basis of information he had received from the warden. Id. at 206-09. This argument
falls short of the mark in that it assumes too much. A damage award under section 1983
is personal in nature-personal to the one committing the wrong. Except by association
through employment, the State Commissioner was not personally associated by his own
will with any of the improper actions taken by the warden of Green Haven. Id. at 206-09.
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the incarceration of Sostre for over one year in punitive segregation was
2
cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth amendment
as made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.63
By way of dictum, the majority of the circuit court acknowledged
the relevance of the concepts encompassing the "new" penology to penal
administration."4 However, regarding the district court's ruling, the
court of appeals concluded:
For a federal court, however, to place a punishment beyond the
power of a state to impose on an inmate is a drastic interference
with the state's free political and administrative processes. It is not
only that we, trained as judges, lack expertise in prison administration.65
The Second Circuit reiterated that, to be cruel and unusual, the punishment must be "barbarous" or "shocking to the conscience." 06 Under
62 See Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 870-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). This court
finds that punitive segregation under the conditions to which he was subjected at Green

Haven, is physically harsh, destructive of morale, dehumanizing in the sense that it is
needlessly degrading, and dangerous to the maintenance of sanity when continued for more

than short periods of time which should certainly not exceed 15 days. Id. at 868. The
district court further held "that subjecting a prisoner to the demonstrated risk of the
loss of his sanity as punishment for any offense is plainly cruel and unusual punishment."
Id. at 871.
63 In contradistinction to prior excuses which federal courts offered in lieu of a
ruling concerning a state prisoner's complaint of cruel and unusual punishment, the
Supreme Court in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) explicitly made this safeguard applicable to the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
04 The court surveyed the expert testimony presented by the Counsel for the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency, Sol Rubin, and Dr. Seymour Halleck, a psychiatrist
from University of Wisconsin. Both men strongly believed that segregation was not part
of contemporary penology. Mr. Rubin saw it as "conducive to mental derangement."
Dr. Halleck testified that it "might cause prisoners to hallucinate and to distort reality."
442 F.2d at 190. Dr. William C. Johnson, a psychiatrist and Director of Mattawan State
Hospital for the criminally insane, also testified, but did not agree that segregation
could endanger the sanity of a prisoner. Id. at 190 n.ll.
65 Id. at 191. The court further states: "[A]s a federal court [we cannot] ... command
state officials to shun a policy that they have decided is suitable because to us the choice
may seem unsound or personally repugnant." Id.
60For this statement, the court cited Church v. Hegestrom, 416 F.2d 449, 451 (2d
Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court, in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), has taken time to
note that:
This Court had little occasion to give precise content to the Eighth Amendment .... The Court recognized ...

that the words of the Amendment are not

precise, and that their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.
Id. at 100-01. (footnote omitted).
However, in spite of the new penology's evolving standards, the Second Circuit chose
instead to ignore the winds of change.
In Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966), the court also spoke of
"cruel and unusual" as a punishment which would "shock the general conscience" or
would be "disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed," or finally, "a
punishment ... [which] . .. goes beyond . .. [its penal] .. . aim." 257 F. Supp. at 679.
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this standard, Sostre's punitive segregation could hardly be considered
"cruel and unusual" punishment. 67 Additionally, the court refused to
accept the district court's holding that prisoners could not be subjected
to punitive segregation for any more than fifteen days.68 It concluded
that punitive segregation per se is not such "cruel and unusual" punishment as to violate the prohibition of the Constitution.69 However, aside
from the appropriate judicial citation, the court stated in support of its
constitutionality, that solitary confinement has been a traditional means
of punishment in almost all the states.70
Thus, in spite of its rumblings about the "new" penology, the court
decided that the possibility of indefinite incarceration in punitive segregation for reasons such as put forth by the warden of Green Haven (i.e.,
67 Sostre's incarceration was not solitary. Most of the time there were several prisoners
in the special segment although for four months there was only one other prisoner. In
light of the fact that he could have participated in "group therapy" sessions, his
isolation could not be termed severe. Neither were the physical conditions of his cell
inhuman. He received no seconds of the main course and no dessert; yet his daily
intake was sufficient. He was allowed to shower and shave with hot water once a week.
He had a toilet and face bowl with running water and was provided with soap and a
towel in his cell. He had the opportunity for one hour of exercise every day with four
or five others in an open yard. However, Sostre refused to subject himself to a search
every day before exercise hour and thus refused the exercise hour. His library privileges
were severely limited to a few dozen "shoot-em-ups" and any law book he wanted. Finally,
he could not attend school or watch television. His conditions were not comparable to
those which existed in Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967) or in Jordan v.
Fitharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966), where the physical conditions as well as
the treatment of the prisoner amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.
65 See note 64 supra. On the question of the length of sentence in solitary, the court
cited a number of authorities which set a limit to segregated confinement. See, e.g., TENN.
CODE ANN. § 41-707 (1955), which states that thirty days is the maximum sentence in
solitary; the ALERICAN LAw INSTITUTE MODEL PENAL CODE § 304.7(3) (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962), also states a thirty day maximum for solitary. 442 F.2d at 192 n.19. While
the court cited these authorities, it warned that any attempt at comparison without facts
would be dangerous. New York has no maximum time period for solitary.
69 See, e.g., Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), where the district
court held that a prisoner's subjection to over one year solitary confinement was constitutional; Ford v. Board of Managers of New Jersey State Prison, 407 F.2d 937 (3d
Cir. 1969), where the circuit court held solitary confinement not violative of the eighth
amendment and further held that the "temporary inconveniences and discomforts incident
thereto cannot be regarded as a basis for judicial relief." Id. at 940.
70 442 F.2d at 192, citing PaRsiDENT's COMsMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMiNISTRATION OF JusTicE, TAsK FORCE REPORT: CoRRECriONS 50-51 (1967). In Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966), the court stated:
When... prison authorities... have abandoned elemental concepts of decency
by permitting conditions to prevail of a shocking and debased nature, then the
courts must intervene-and intervene promptly-to restore the primal rules of
a civilized community in accord with the mandate of the Constitution of the
United States.
Id. at 680.
For a good discussion of the area, see generally Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate
Rights, 5 HARV. CIV. PIGHTS-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 227 (1970). The article provides a good
general background to the area Mr. Jacob calls "a new and draconian legal universe" which
engulfs the convict after sentencing.
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to force the prisoner to obey the rules of the institution) was not a
violation of the constitutional prohibition. It noted that Sostre's conditions were "several notches above" what it had condemned as "cruel
and unusual" in Wright v. McCann.71 As to the district court's argument
that Sostre's confinement would be considered "cruel and unusual" on
account of its disproportionate relation to the infraction the warden
believed was violated (if the district court had believed the warden), 72
the circuit court disagreed. It reasoned that prison officials may use any
constitutional means (including solitary) to maintain discipline and
order in a state prison. The court was emphatic on the point that if the
warden's motives had been proper, his imposition of solitary would
have been entirely proper and Sostre would have had no claim. 7 3 This
section of the majority opinion induced Judges Smith and Feinberg to
dissent. Judge Smith believed that the "cruel and unusual" punishment
finding of the district court was correct. He reasoned that any punishment which might cause a prisoner to go insane is clearly within the
Constitution's prohibition. The fact that the prisoner could avoid this
by submitting to prison authorities, Judge Smith found irrelevant.7 4
Judge Feinberg believed that the "cruel and unusual" punishment holding of the district court should have been upheld. He concluded that
the court should set up a maximum time limit for solitary. Since the
majority stated that the punishment is not unconstitutional as long as
the prisoner can submit, a prisoner could be kept in solitary for many
years. The submission possibility may be there, but at the same time so
is the danger to the prisoner's sanity. The uncertainty of the length of
such punishment also preys upon the psyche. Furthermore, Judge Feinberg could not understand how the court could sanction the disproportionate punishment. The majority relied on the seriousness of all of
Sostre's offenses 7 5 but at least two of Sostre's alleged infractions could
not be classified as serious. 7 6 Judge Feinberg concluded "if such con387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967).
312 F. Supp. at 871 (citing the eighth amendment as prohibiting disproportionate
punishment); see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring),
where Justice Douglas refers to disproportionate punishment in terms of the eighth
amendment.
73 442 F.2d at 194.
74 Id. at 206. (Smith, J., dissenting).
75 "[WAe express no view as to the constitutionality of such segregated confinement
if it had been imposed on account of any one or any combination of offenses
charged against Sostre other than all of them."
442 F.2d at 194 n.28.
The majortiy suggested that it might be disproportionate if not all the infractions
were charged. Judge Feinberg said it is disproportionate. Id. at 208. (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
76 Preparing legal papers for others and having a law review tables of contents in
one's possession are not serious by any standard.
71
72
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finement, in the majority's view, could ever be so excessive a penalty as
to be unconstitutional, it should be declared so when there is no basis
for the confinement at all."7 7 Judge Feinberg's arguments provide a
succinct critique of the validity of the majority's position.
After its discussion as to the eighth amendment ramifications of
Sostre's punishment the court of appeals focussed upon the questions
concerning procedural due process.78 The district court, in effect, held
that a certain amount of procedural due process is applicable to a
prisoner at a prison disciplinary hearing when the prisoner might receive a punishment, i.e., punitive segregation which could cause him to
lose earned or possible good-time credit. The district court reasoned
that time spent in punitive segregation meant a loss of good-time credit,
which in turn causes the prisoner to spend a longer period of time incarcerated. Thus, it mandated, as constitutionally necessary, that the
prisoner be notified in writing of the charges against him and the rule
which he allegedly violated; that the hearing be before an impartial
officer and that the prisoner have the right to cross-examine and rebut
witnesses; that there be a written record of the hearing, decision and
evidence relied on in the decision; and that the prisoner have a right to
79
counsel or a substitute.
The district court relied on recent federal case law, including the
Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, s0 to support its requirement of minimal due process safeguards. Additionally, it cited a recent
decision of the Second Circuit - Escalera v. New York City Housing
Authority8 l - as authority for its holding. Neither case involved prison77 442 F.2d at 209. Judge Feinberg is referring to the warden's improper motives.
78 In his petition for rehearing to the Second Circuit, the plaintiff noted that he
felt the holding of the district court was in tune with Supreme Court precedent, while
the court of appeals' decision fell short of these in understanding. Plaintiff's Petition for
Rehearing at 2. The district court felt that the plaintiff was placed in solitary for over
one year "without the minimal procedural safeguards required for the imposition of such

drastic punishment upon a prisoner." 312 F.2d at 872.
79 312 F. Supp. at 872. United States ex rel. Marcial v. Fay, 247 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 915 (1958) stated pointedly: "We must not play fast and loose with
basic constitutional rights [of a prisoner] in the interest of administrative efficiency." 247
F.2d at 669.
As to determine when due process has been given, in Kritsky v. McGinnis, 313 F.
Supp. 1247 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), a court has said that [d]ue Process is an elusive concept but
there are settled satisfactory guides to discern its absence or presence." 313 F. Supp. at
1250.
For a general discussion of the problems surrounding procedural due process in the
penitentiary, see generally Note, Procedural Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Actions,
2 LovoLA U.L.J. (Chicago) 110 (1971); Note, ProceduralDue Process in Peno-Correctional
Administration:Progressionand Regression, 45 ST. JOHN'S REv. 468 (1971).

80397 US. 254 (1970). In this case the Court required states to afford welfare
recipients minimum due process before terminating their payments.
81425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 US. 853 (1970). In this case the court
held that before the state could terminate someone's residence in public housing, it must
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ers nor even a criminal matter; the respective courts required due process for welfare termination in Goldberg and public housing in Escalera.
If these privileges require due process, the court reasoned a prisoner
-who
is at the mercy of his jailers- should likewise have his rights
protected.
However, the court of appeals viewed the relation between prison
disciplinary proceedings and due process requirements in quite a different light. Although noting the importance of both Goldberg and
Escalera to the development of the application of procedural due process, it concluded that Mempa v. Rhay8 2 was more relevant to the instant
case. In Mempa, the Supreme Court held that persons convicted of
crimes were entitled to counsel at their deferred sentencing proceedings,
i.e., after trial, so that they would be guaranteed to receive minimum
fairness. In noting the importance of the Mempa case to proceedings
beyond the trial, the court pointed out that to date the courts in the
federal system have not decided whether to apply Mempa to parole
revocation hearings.

3

The court avoided this difficult issue by insisting that a state's
labelling of a right as a privilege, does not relieve the state of the duty to
provide due process in proceedings affecting that "right." Considering
punitive segregation as a deprivation of liberty (right) and not simply
as the removal of a privilege, the court concluded "that Sostre was entitled to 'due process of law' before he was punished for an infraction
of prison rules."8'

4

The basic question was what would be the scope of

the procedural due process8 5 which would be afforded to the prisoner.
afford him the minimum procedural safeguards of due process. Escalera and Goldberg are
interesting in that they both applied procedural due process to an area which was not
generally considered a right but merely a privilege of citizenship. The Petition of
Plaintiff for Rehearing argues that both these cases as well as a long list of other authorities they cite support the reasoning of the district court.
82 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
83 The defendants argued on appeal that because there are no due process requirements for parole revocation hearings the same rule should apply to prison discipline
hearings. Appellant-Defendant Brief on Appeal at -.
The plaintiff in his Petition for rehearing notes that since the New York State Court
or Appeals has recently ruled that a prisoner has a right to counsel at a parole revocation
hearing, the defense argument falls. People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376,
267 N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971).
84 442 F.2d at 196.
85 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d
135 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 920 (1967), has observed:
"[u]nder our constitutional system, the payment which society exacts for transgressions of the law does not include relegating the transgressor to arbitrary and
capricious action."
Id. at 141.
In Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (D.C. Ala.), aff'd 890 U.S. 333 (1968), the district
court similarly noted that:
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The circuit court recognized that there are degrees of due process and
that different situations call for very different safeguards.8 6 Rarely, however, do courts provide for the full requirements in the fashion of the
courtroom. Hence, the court concluded:
Most important, we think it unadvisable for a federal court to pass
judgment one way or another as to the truly decisive consideration,
whether formal due process requirements would be likely to help
or hinder in the state's endeavor to preserve order and discipline
in its prisons and to return a rehabilitated individual to society.
It would be too simplistic to dissociate the impact of punishment
meted out after a disciplinary hearing from the method by which
the hearing itself is conducted.8 7
This language betrays the feeling of the court toward due process in
prisons. It harkens back to that employed by federal courts earlier in
this century to prevent state prisoner cases from entering the federal
arena.8 8 At this point in the opinion, the court attempted to justify the
severe limitation signaled by its rationale. It suggested that the paucity
of social and scientific research into prison conditions precludes any
attempt by the court to fashion a set of rigid procedural rules. According
to the court's rationale, it is for the authorities of the states to decide
what procedures will work best in its correctional institutions. This attitude is contrary to that of federal courts which have actually entered
into the field of prison discipline and procedure and have exerted pressure toward reform. 89 Nevertheless, the court of appeals reversed the
order of the district court requiring formal due process procedures. In
so doing, the court hastened to emphasize that its holding would not
sanction submitting convicts to arbitrary and capricious action in
prison 0 such treatment would be unconstitutional. 91 Although the
court refused to provide a concrete framework of procedural due process, it did not entirely abandon the prisoner to his jailors. It was careful
It is well established that prisoners do not lose all their constitutional rights and
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
follow them into prison and protect them there from unconstitutional action
on the part of prison authorities carried out under color of state law.
Id. at 331. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
86 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). quoted in 442 F.2d at 196.

87 442 F.2d at 197. For instance the court does not think it advisable to use formal
rules of evidence at prison disciplinary hearings. The court asserts that the prison officials

are in the immediate situation and their procedures are, therefore, simpler.
8sSee note 52 supra. The court also notes that New York State has made some
basic changes in procedure since this action has reached the courts. 442 F.2d at 199 n.42.
89 See, e.g., Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970) (required some formal
due process to be accorded prisoners).
9o See generally Herschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionalityof Prison Life, 55
VA. L Ray. 795 (1969).
91442 F.2d at 198.
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to observe that punishment should "be premised on facts rationally
determined. '92 For a disciplinary proceeding to fulfill this requirement
of due process, the prisoner must be "confronted with the accusation,
informed of the evidence against him" and be "afforded a reasonable
opportunity to explain his actions. '93 In contradistinction to the formality required by the district court, these flexible rules are what the
circuit court considered to be the necessary minimum. The majority
left further determination of the minimum standard to a case-by-case
approach. Yet, the majority's holding in this area was not subscribed to
by all the judges. Two of the concurring judges - Lumbard and Waterman- raised objections, although in different directions. Judge Lumbard objected to the majority's expressing its ideas as to disciplinary
procedure, 94 Judge Waterman insisted that if any practice of a state does
not measure up to the minimal requirements, it should be struck down
regardless of whether any empirical information concerning prison
95
conditions exists.
The due process rationale expressed by the majortiy in Sostre is
applicable only to the limited circumstances of an in-prison disciplinary
proceeding. In contrast, in UnitedStates ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State
Board of Parole,98 the court of appeals concluded that Bey
was not accorded due process of law when his parole was revoked
and he was reimprisoned following a 1960 hearing before the Connecticut State Board of Parole where Bey appeared alone, but was
not represented by a lawyer. 97
The only issue raised on appeal by Bey was the question of his right to
counsel at his parole revocation hearing.
As a consequence of his conviction for second degree murder, Bey
was serving a life sentence in a Connecticut State prison. After serving
a portion of his sentence, Bey was released into the custody of a parole
officer pursuant to statute. 9s As is the case with paroles in general, his
92 Id.

93 Id. (citing a long series of authority).
94 Id. at 206. (Lumbard, J., concurring).
95 Id. (Waterman, J., concurring). Judge Waterman asserted that statistics are by no
means essential to the protection of constitutional rights.
90443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971) (Judges Waterman, Kaufman and Smith took part).
97 Id. at 1080. In its immediately prior term, the court of appeals, in Mergechino v.
Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), decided that state prisoners are not entitled under
due process, to legal representation at hearings concerning their release on parole. The
question of counsel at parole revocation hearings was left open. The Bey case concerned
due process and parole revocation hearing. Subsequent to Menechino v. Oswald, the
Ncw York Court of Appeals, in People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267
N.E.2d 238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971), held that counsel is required at a parole revocation
hearing because of the due process requirement.
98 CONN. Gm.N. STAT. ANN. § 54-125, 126 (Supp. 1971).
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release was conditioned upon his observance of several standard restrictions upon his behavior. 9 Within six months of his release, Bey was
arrested for violations of his conditional release. 0 0° After a hearing was
held before the parole board, at which Bey appeared alone, the board
ordered Bey reimprisoned for the duration of his term.' 01 After denial
of his habeas corpus petition in the state courts, 10 2 Bey applied to a federal district court, which also denied his petition causing statutory and
constitutional questions concerning the revocation hearing to rise. Only
the issue of the right to counsel at the hearing was appealed. After a
survey of the state of the law in the other circuits, 03 the court cited state
cases in Pennsylvania, New York and Michigan' 04 as persuasive authority for its own reasoning. As it did in Sostre, the court of appeals attacked the old privilege- right dichotomy so often resurrected to
exclude a particular issue from due process requirements. However, on
the basis of Goldberg v. Kelly'0 5 and Escalera v. New York Housing
0 6 there is no doubt that the privilege
Authority,1
argument is no longer
a refuge from due process standards. 10 7 In further explication of its
reasoning, the court of appeals attempted to distinguish the instant case
from Sostre v. McGinni 0 8 and Menechino v. Oswald.10 9 In Bey, the
09 For example, the parolee is not to possess any deadly weapons and is not to leave
the state without prior permission. 443 F.2d at 1081.
100 According to his parole officer's reports there were several reasons for the revocation being recommended. In several instances, Bey's private sexual behavior was reported. An unnamed so-called reliable source informed the officer that Bey threatened
to leave the state, had a knife in his possession, had bragged of killing a policeman
and claimed he could kill again. Upon this report, Bey's room was searched and a
knife was found among his clothing. On the day of the search, Bey was arrested.

101443 F.2d at 1082.
102 Bey v. Reincke, No. 151663 (Super. Ct. Hartford County, July 30, 1969) (cited by

court).
103 In the Tenth Circuit it has been held that if parolees are permitted to retain
counsel at revocation hearing, then counsel must be provided to those incapable of retaining counsel. Earnest v. Wallingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969). However, counsel
may be entirely excluded, Fukins v. Colorado, 434 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
The Ninth Circuit, in Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1967), and the
Sixth Circuit, in Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cerl. denied, 392 U.S. 956 (1968),
both rejected claims of right to counsel at such hearings. The other circuits have not
squarely decided this issue. 443 F.2d at 1083.
'0 4 Warren v. Michigan Parole Bd., 23 Mich. App. 754, 179 N.W.2d 664, appeal dis.
missed, 384 Mich. 812, 184 N.W2d 459 (1971); People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27
N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 21 N.Y.2 d 449 (1971); Commonwealth v. Tinson, 433 Pa.
328, 249 A.2d 549 (1969).
105397 US. 254 (1970).
106425 F.2d 853, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).

107 In light of these developments, the Bey court observed, the "probation as a matter of grace theory" of Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935) [and analogously parole is
matter of grace] is no longer of any use.
108442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
10D 430 F.2d 403-(2d Cir. 1970).
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parolee "stands to lose a 'presently enjoyed' interest in his conditional freedom...' a liberty akin to a private interest" 110 The status of
parolees is very different from that of the prisoner being disciplined or
denied parole. As the court stated,
[p]arole revocation will inevitably connote wrongdoing and thus
the citizen whose parole was once revoked will continue to carry
a burden analogous and in addition to his criminal stigma ....
Thus, it seems incontestable to say that "substantial rights" of Bey
were affected by the revocation proceeding."'
In addition, the court observed that attorneys are well prepared to
present evidence at revocation hearings" 2 - their method as well as
their knowledge will be useful to both the parolee's and board's interests. Thus, the court did not envision right to counsel as a burden on
the parole system, but as a benefit to the parole board. However, in this
context, the court carefully noted that the attorney's role at the revocation hearing is to be limited to the presentation of relevant evidence at
the hearing -trial tactics have no place within such interpretation of
the attorney's role. In a sense the attorney is envisioned as the impartial
fact-gatherer protecting the parolee's rights and thereby aiding the parole board in its funtioning. Therefore, the Second Circuit has viewed
parolee's rights to due process in the instant case quite differently from
an incarcerated prisoner's rights to due process in the Sostre case.
Finally, in Sostre, the court of appeals offered a careful analysis of
a prisoner's rights of communication and expression. Sostre had complained that his right to correspond with his attorney as protected by
the sixth amendment was violated by the deletion of portions of his letters by prison officials before mailing. In addition, prison authorities
had refused, on occasion, to mail a letter of complaint to a postal inspector concerning certified mail and some correspondence to Sostre's
co-defendant.
Although the circuit court subscribed to the basic rationale of the
district court on this issue,"1 3 the court approached it in a slightly less
110 443 F.2d at 1086.

M Id. at 1087.

112 The court noted that Bey had to prepare his case in prison far from both the

witnesses and evidence he might wish to gather. Id. at 1088.
115 The reaction of the district courts to these complaints was to hold that the actions of the prison officials in censoring or refusing to mail Sostre's letters was illegal.
In support of its holding, the court cited Ex parte Hull, 31 U.S. 546 (1941). In that case,
the court held that prisoners were guaranteed the right of access to the courts and any
unreasonable interference with that right was unlawful. The court further extended the
Hull doctrine in light of the fact that courts are not the only refuge to which prisoners
can complain.
Prison officials cited Brabson v. Wilkins, 19 N.Y.2d 433, 227 N.E.2d 383, 280 N.Y.S.2d
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expansive and less absolute fashion. In the beginning of its discussion,
the court observed the importance of correspondence to the well being
of inmates. However, despite this importance, the court noted that order
and discipline are also quite important. In fact, reasonable controls incidental to content are constitutional. Yet, when his case or care are the
subject matter of his letters, a prisoner has a right to write to courts,
officials and attorneys without being censored. 14 Considering the controlled environment, the court felt it was necessary to allow at least this
freedom as a check on official excesses. As to the question of its burden
on administration, the court perceived the problems to be outweighed
by the prisoner's rights. Nevertheless, if in the guise of his case or care
the prisoner abuses this right for unlawful purposes, prison authorities
could censor correspondence so as to prevent harm. But after allowing
officials this discretion, the court reiterated the importance of the free
flow of correspondence when the purpose of the letter is for the prisoner's case and care. While agreeing with the district court that prison
officials' actions in censoring Sostre's letters to his attorney and withholding his letter to the postal inspector were improper, the court
stated that in the interests of the prison system, officials may open and
read all incoming and outgoing correspondence to detect unlawful
correspondence. The exact extent of the prisoner's rights in correspondence the court left to later cases. However, the court did reverse Judge
Motley's ruling allowing correspondence with Sostre's co-defendant. In
other words, the court interpreted the ban against correspondence with
her as being a reasonableregulation. Therefore, it continued the district
court injunction against unlawful interference with correspondence.
In connection with this right, the court examined the district
court's ruling concerning Sostre's legal aid to other prisoners and his
punishment for merely possessing literature and expressing his beliefs.
The district court enjoined the warden from interfering with Sostre's
aiding of other prisoners with legal matters 1 5 on the authority of the
561 (1967), to support their interference with communications between a prisoner and
his attorney on matters not concerning his case or his care. However, the district court

embraced the expansive doctrine enunciated by the three dissenters in that case in holding that there were institutions besides the courts to which prisoners could complain
and that the letter recipients should determine what was relevant to the prisoner's case
and care. Thus, a prisoner should be able to communicate with public officials and
attorneys as well as with court's, without interference. Prison discipline does not outweigh the right to communicate. Therefore, the prison censoring and refusal to mail
Sostre's letters was illegal. It also held Sostre had the right to communicate with his
co-defendant. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
114 Coleman v. Peyton, 862 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1966) is cited by the court as authority
to support this holding.
115 Sostre was lending out law reviews and translating a letter from a state court to
another prisoner into the prisoner's native language.
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Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Avery." 6 However, on the
authority of the same case, the court of appeals reversed the lower court's
injunction. Interpreting the present circumstances in light of Johnson,
the circuit court asserted that the Supreme Court would allow prison
officials to impose "reasonable restrictions."1 17 Under Johnson, since
New York provides no legal assistance, jailhouse lawyers must be allowed to help others; but a prisoner can be required to ask permission
of authorities before being allowed to "practice." Thus, since Sostre
never asked for permission and the only possible challenge he could
make was that permission was withheld unreasonably, the court reversed
the district court holding as incorrect. However, the circuit court did
not reverse the lower court's injunction against prison officials punishing Sostre for expressing his political beliefs and possessing political
literature.11 8 In fact, the court of appeals expanded the scope of the injunction. It enjoined officials from punishing Sostre for possessing any
literature or expressing his views "except for violation of reasonable
regulations." 10 In making the modification, the court expressed the
belief that it saw no need to single out political literature. But, the court
also mentioned that reasonable regulations are possible. In affirming the
injunction in its modified form, the court was objecting to Sostre's
being punished for possessing the literature and expressing his beliefs
as he did. 120 The court objected to the punishment and not to the warden's determination. Moreover, the court, in effect said, that it would
not question the warden's judgment that the literature might cause disorder in the prison. For the court, the proper vehicle for enforcing
reasonable regulations aimed at preserving order in prison would be
confiscation of a prisoner's literature. Confiscation would be sufficient
to check any possible threat that the literature might cause to order and
discipline; and furthermore, it would remove the threat of punishment
for expression and prevent the inadvertent control of ideas. The circuit
116 393 U.S. 483 (1969). This case held that jailhouse lawyers may help other inmates
prepare writs of habeas corpus if no legal aid is provided by the state prison. Id. at 490.
The case does not hold that states must provide counsel for prisoners seeking postconviction relief. Id. at 488. The Court also recognized that jailhouse lawyers may cause
a prison disciplinary problem. Id.
117 Id. at 490. The Supreme Court spoke in terms of time limits and approved
locations.
118 According to prison officials, about a month after being released from solitary
pursuant to court order, Sostre was punished for having "inflammatory racist literature"
in his possession. This included items about the Black Panther party, R.N.A., black
poetry and some of Sostre's own writing.
119 442 F.2d at 204.
120 The Sostre court ites Fuiwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).

1972]

SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE

court only allowed delimitation of a prisoner's freedom of expression
within the framework of reasonable regulations for order and discipline.
In concluding, the court addressed the question of the proper
relief to be accorded Sostre. The court had already held that Sostre had
been segregated unlawfully for his political beliefs and legal activities.
Since such incarceration caused him to lose the chance to earn goodtime, the court decided to award Sostre the full amount of days of goodtime he would have received if he had not been punished. Although
he may not have earned the good-time, the violation of his rights required that it be allowed to him. Regarding money damages, however,
the court was not so generous. The court acknowledged that Sostre had
the right to money damages for violation of his constitutional rights
under section 1983.121 However, it concluded that the award under section 1983 was personal in nature and, therefore, reversed the district
court's damage award against the State Commissioner of Corrections
and also reversed the holding on punitive damages. Furthermore, in
relation to the award against the warden of Green Haven, the court
noted that the warden personally responsible under law was deceased,
and that his successor is in no way liable for his predecessor's actions. In
light of the fact that the plaintiff never substituted a party for the deceased warden, the court had no one against whom it could exact damages. Thus, although it decided that he was entitled to be compensated
for violation of his rights, the court, on the basis of a technical error, in
effect, awarded him nothing. Consistent with the tone of its opinion, the
majority ended its decision by reflecting that its decision in no way
condones or ignores the conditions which exist in penitentiaries.
The dissent by Judges Hays and Moore offered no viable alternative to the majority's conclusions. The dissenting judges called for a
122
complete reversal of all the relief granted to Sostre by the trial court.
Responding to the careful and intricate scrutiny that the majority applied to each facet of the case, the dissenters objected in a brief opinion
stating that the majority had ignored two basic items. First, they considered the rights the court afforded the prisoner. To them, there was
a great difference between the constitutional rights to be afforded a prisoner as opposed to a free man. However, after that generalization, the
121 See Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 425 (D. Md. 1966) (holding that
prison authorities acting under prison rules are acting under "color of Law"). In Sostre,
the court explained that section 1983 actions do not violate the eleventh amendment
because the awards are against individuals not the state. Damages are to be paid by

the individual. 442 F.2d at 205.
122 442 F.2d at 209.
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dissent did not proceed to explain the differences. Second, the dissenters argued that the courts should not interfere with the internal administration of the prisons unless there is a serious deprivation. Again,
they failed to define exactly what they would consider a serious deprivation.
However, in Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 123 which was decided after
Sostre, the dissenting opinion in Sostre of Judges Hays and Moore
formed the basis for their majority opinion in a case decided by a threejudge court. In Rodriguez, the plaintiff was incarcerated in a New York
State prison for an indeterminate sentence of one and one half years to
1 24
four years. He was eligible to earn good-time credit for his behavior.
Yet, upon any violation of the institutional rules, this good-time credit
could be forfeited or cancelled 125 upon the discretionary determination
of a designated prison official or board so empowered.
Rodriguez was charged with possession of five contraband letters
and six contraband pornographic photographs of his wife. The deputy
warden held that in light of these violations, Rodriques should forfeit
one hundred and twenty days of good-time credit. 126 In the prisoner's
action under section 1983, the federal district court found that this
cancellation was imposed not as punishment but to compel the plaintiff
to disclose how he received the contraband goods. There being no rule
about having to inform, it was therefore unconstitutional. The district
court ordered the restoration of the credit; and as a result of this reduction Rodriguez was subsequently released in the custody of the parole board.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court. The majority opinion, per Judge Hays, stated that since the action by the prisoner sought early release, it was in effect a habeas corpus petition. As
such, the plaintiff would be required under federal law to exhaust state
remedies, which he had not done. Giving him an opportunity to reduce
the loss by informing was not considered to be unconstitutional. Finally, the opinion concluded, as the dissent did in Sostre, that "the
federal courts should refuse to interfere with internal state prison administration except in the most extreme cases involving a shocking de123 451 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1971).
124 The prisoner could apply his good-time credit "toward

the reduction of the
maximum term of his sentence." Id. at 731. See N.Y. CoRP.c. LAW § 803(l) (McKinney
1968) (Such good-time credit cannot exceed one-third of the sentence).
125 N.Y. CoanEc. LAW § 803(3) (McKinney 1968).
126 Aside from cancellation of good-time credit, Rodriguez was put in solitary for
one and one-half days and transferred to another prison where he was placed in segregation. 451 F.2d at 731.
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privation of fundamental rights." 127 This holding of the Second Circuit
is in direct conflict with the views expressed by the majority in Sostre.
As the majority in a three-judge court, the Sostre dissent disregarded
the trend of argument as developed in Sostre. However, in light of Sostre, the Rodriguez holding is not an insurmountable obstacle to the
definite trend toward use of section 1983 by state prisoners.
Contemplating the prison environment and the status of the prisoner in relation to his superiors, it is difficult to understand how the
court in Sostre can look so naively on prison practices. Prison officials
are merely men. Due to the closed environs, their task is more difficult
that that of most men. However, this should not exculpate them from
the scrutiny which the courts apply to other institutions within our
society. The man in prison has rights guaranteed by our constitutional
system. The walls of a prison do not create immunity for prison authorities. In this closed society it is clear that a prisoner's rights can easily be
violated without detection. Therefore, especially in light of recent occurrences in our prisons, the courts in exercising their constitutional
duty, should venture more often and more closely into the depths of
our penal system.
SPEEDY TRIAL. WITHIN THE CIRCUIT

The right to a speedy trial is of ancient origin.128 Today the right
has distinct constitutional12 9 and statutory' 0 bases. Although ineffectual
127 451 F.2d at 732 (citing authorities); Judge Waterman dissented on the basis of the
district court decision. Id. at 733.
128 The right to a speedy trial was recognized at least as far back as the Magna Carta
(1215) which stated: "To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice."
United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 196 (D. Md.), aff'd 350 U.S. 857 (1955). The Assize of Clarendon, written in 1166, provides evidence of the early recognition of speedy

justice:
[A]nd when a robber or murderer or thief or receiver of them has been arrested,
. . if the justices are not about to come speedily enough into the country where
they have been taken, let the sheriffs send word to the nearest justice . . . and
the justices shall send back word to the sheriffs informing them where they desire the men to be brought before them; and let the sheriffs bring them before
the justices.
2 ENG. Hisr. DOCUmENTrS 408 (1953) (emphasis added), quoted in Klopfer v. United States,
386 US. 213, 223 n.9 (1966).
129 The sixth amendment provides for a fair and speedy trial in all criminal prosecutions. This sixth amendment right as implemented by the fourteenth amendment was
held applicable to the states in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1966).
10 FED. R. Cmi. P. 48(b) provides:
[i]f there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in

filing an information against a defendant who has been held to answer the district court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the

court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint. (emphasis added).
It has been held that Rule 48(b) by providing for dismissal because of "unnecessary
delay" goes beyond the sixth amendment by allowing a court to exercise its discretion

